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Deterrence in the IsraeliIranian Strategic Standoff
W. ANDREW TERRILL

O

ne of the central concerns of current US foreign policy is that Iran will
develop a nuclear weapons capability which it could use to threaten
the security of other regional states. This fear exists despite the declassification of a 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) “key judgments”
summary stating that the Iranian nuclear weapons development program
was frozen in 2003 and did not appear to have been restarted as of the publication of the report.1 In elaborating on this NIE in early 2008, the then-Director of National Intelligence, Admiral Michael McConnell, told Congress
that he regretted the wording of the document because he felt it left the erroneous impression that Iran had given up on obtaining nuclear weapons.2
The entire history of the Iranian nuclear technology program, including previous efforts to keep the enrichment effort secret, suggests that
Tehran will almost certainly continue to pursue a nuclear weapons capability despite some reassuring factors noted in the 2007 NIE. The NIE itself acknowledges the existence of a secret program, simply by noting its
apparent suspension. Iran’s continuing and declared focus on nuclear enrichment is particularly disturbing since the development of a large-scale
enrichment capability is the most technologically challenging aspect of
the effort to construct a nuclear weapon (despite the alternative uses of this
technology for peaceful purposes).3 Additionally, according to a variety of
public sources, the Israeli intelligence agencies believe that Iran has made
greater progress in moving toward a nuclear weapons capability than is reflected in the NIE or Admiral McConnell’s recent comments.4 British and
French leaders have been sufficiently concerned by Iranian activities to issue strong warnings about potential problems from nuclear adventurism.5
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The questions that arise are how dangerous will an Iran armed with
nuclear weapons be, and what will be the primary targets for Iranian nuclear weapons should Tehran obtain such a capability? In particular, the
incendiary rhetoric of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad suggests
that it is reasonable to wonder if there is a high risk that Iran will attack Israel with nuclear weapons during some future period of high Israeli-Iranian
tension (such as might emerge out of a new Lebanon war similar to that
of 2006). A related question is what can Israel do about such a situation?
This article forecasts a serious chance of failure in the current American and global efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons regardless of whether such attempts are pursued through the use of economic
and political sanctions or air strikes. It is doubtful that either option can
guarantee the end of the Iranian nuclear program for reasons to be discussed
later. The more radical option of air strikes has a significant potential to undermine other western goals in the Middle East, including stabilizing Iraq,
while failing to do much more than delay the Iranian weapons program for
a few years at best. An alternative possibility is that Israel as a potential Iranian strategic adversary will be able to establish a system of deterrence and
missile defense based on a combination of technology it already possesses
or is developing. Such a system would seriously limit (perhaps even overcome) the chances of a successful Iranian strike against Israel, while raising
the cost of even an unsuccessful attack to apocalyptic levels for the Tehran
regime. Ideally, Israeli-sponsored deterrence will not have to be maintained
indefinitely if the United States and Europe can generate a diplomatic strategy for managing Iranian power, especially if a more moderate leadership
eventually emerges in Iran. In this regard, some (but not all) Israeli leaders
have not ruled out the possibility that the United States can achieve important diplomatic gains that will benefit Israel in negotiations with Iran.6
Israeli Concerns Regarding Iran
Israel has a unique historical legacy making it especially sensitive
to military threats from hostile powers such as Iran. The Nazi Holocaust
in particular has given many Israelis an enduring sense of vulnerability,
while Israel’s limited acceptance by other states within the Middle East
Dr. W. Andrew Terrill is the General Douglas MacArthur Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute. He is a
retired Army Reserve Foreign Area Officer (Middle East) and holds degrees from California State Polytechnic University, the University of California, Riverside, and Claremont
Graduate University.
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As Israel considers its security posture, Iran has
assumed a role of greater importance in strategic
thought and military planning.

has contributed to an ongoing sense of insecurity.7 The Israelis have also
had several traumatic experiences with intelligence failures and their own
complacency about the capabilities of hostile forces. The most dramatic of
these intelligence setbacks was the failure to detect Egyptian and Syrian
plans for a surprise attack in October 1973 until the eve of that war.8 More
recently, many Israeli citizens have criticized their government’s conduct of
the July-August 2006 war with Hizbollah guerrillas in Lebanon, although
these problems are generally viewed as a failure in planning by the senior
leadership and not simply an intelligence failure. A number of informed
observers believe that Israel did not lose this war, but very few Israelis
would maintain that they won the conflict by obtaining the goals Israeli
leaders had announced.9 Rather, Israelis have tended to express disillusionment with what they view as the limited successes of the Lebanon campaign
as well as the ability of Hizbollah to disrupt normal life in northern Israel
through a campaign of attacks using the small but deadly Katusha rockets.10
Currently, as Israel considers its security posture within the region, Iran has assumed a role of greater importance in strategic thought
and military planning. Israeli concerns about Tehran have been serious for
some time but escalated as Iran became increasingly powerful and assertive within the region, especially since the destruction of Saddam Hussein’s
regime in Iraq. Additionally, President Ahmadinejad has made a series of
reprehensible statements denying the Holocaust, calling for the elimination
of Israel, and the transfer of its Jewish inhabitants to Europe, North America, or Alaska.11 Following his election in 2005, Ahmadinejad attempted
to present himself as the face of the regime despite the limited powers of
his office. While the worst of Ahmadinejad’s statements were made following publication of Danish cartoons ridiculing the Prophet Mohammed,
such statements remain deeply worrisome to Israelis with some believing
his extremism signals an existential threat.12 Ahmadinejad and others frequently repeat such statements, suggesting that their inflammatory rhetoric
represents more than a one-time spasm of anger as a result of the Danish
cartoons. The key question regarding these statements is, nevertheless, not
the fact they are offensive, but do they indicate a future Iranian approach to
Israel that includes a willingness to escalate to nuclear weapons in a crisis?
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Interpretation of Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric as a blueprint for policy
would appear mistaken on the basis of the statements alone. Ahmadinejad
also predicts that the “satanic power” of the United States will soon be eliminated along with Israel, although it is difficult to translate this statement
into a coherent plan or a policy that is likely to achieve such a result. Nor is
it clear that hinting at future Iranian military strikes against Israel is the best
way to prepare for such a confrontation if Tehran truly views war as a realistic option. Conversely, extreme statements may be politically useful to help
the Iranian President deflect attention and criticism from his bumbling and
chaotic economic policies. These policies are leading to a growth in Iranian
poverty despite the staggering increase in oil prices prior to the global economic crisis of 2008. Even before the collapse of oil prices in late 2008, Ahmadinejad’s efforts to manage the Iranian economy like a patronage machine
contributed to an annual 30 percent inflation rate and unemployment levels
of at least 10 percent as well as substantial underemployment.13 His future
popularity will be placed under a severe challenge by constraints in these patronage resources should the price of oil remain at dramatically lower levels.
While the popular scenario of a suicidal regime in Tehran attacking Israel as soon as it is technologically able to do so is undoubtedly
oversimplified, there are nevertheless other more plausible scenarios under which the Iranians might consider such an assault. The most likely
of these scenarios involves a crisis between the United States and Iran.
Since the US homeland is beyond the reach of current and projected Iranian strategic platforms, Tehran can only deter the United States with its
missiles and aircraft by threatening allies or US forces deployed in the region. Israel would be a natural target for Iran in any scenario involving
US-Iranian tensions, followed by a possible breakdown of deterrence and
the onset of war. Additionally, if the Iranians believed some future US attack against them was actually an effort at regime change, they would be
more likely to consider striking the Israelis with available systems. In such
a scenario the Tehran leadership might view itself as having little to lose.
A future Iranian attack on Israel during a time of crisis is plausible, and acquiring ways of deterring such strikes should be an Israeli priority. Deterrence would successfully undermine the strategic viability of
such an option for Tehran and prevent another Middle Eastern war. It is,
nevertheless, important to remember that Iran has ideological and practical constraints that under current conditions would rule out such strikes
in all but the most extreme circumstances. These constraints are: (1) Collateral damage from Iranian attacks could kill a staggeringly large number
of Palestinians and might also harm the citizens of several Arab/Muslim
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states bordering Israel. (2) Israeli strategic forces may be called upon to
engage in massive retaliation for any Iranian strike. (3) Israel maintains a
strong and expanding system of missile defenses and a civil defense system consisting of underground shelters and facilities. All of these factors
need to be considered when determining the ways in which Tehran is already constrained and how Israel may be able to further constrain Iran.
Palestinian-Iranian Relations and Collateral Damage
The Iranian leadership has attempted to portray itself as the foremost defender of the Palestinians in a variety of international and Islamic
fora; it has also transferred significant amounts of money to the Palestinian
Islamic group Hamas and other militant organizations in support of their
struggles against Israel.14 Tehran’s claim of being the leading defender of
the Palestinians is sometimes difficult to believe since Iran is not an Arab
nation and has no bonds of ethnic kinship to the Palestinians. Nevertheless,
Iran pursues this distinction with vigor and perseverance. Iranian leaders
frequently speak of the suffering of the Palestinian people and the pain of
Israeli occupation. President Ahmadinejad, for example, has worked to increase Iranian ties to Palestinian Islamic leaders and calls for a day “when all
[Palestinian] refugees return to their home.”15 The Iranian leadership presents itself as more than simply anti-Israeli; in fact, it portrays itself as the
most trustworthy guardian of Palestinian rights. Rather than supporting a
two-state solution, Tehran seeks the elimination of Israel and its replacement by an Islamic Palestine. Ideologically, the first objective is meaningless for Tehran unless the second objective can be accomplished as well.
The issue of Palestinian collateral damage is one of the most important political and ideological issues facing Iranian strategists, although
it is seldom mentioned in discussions of Iranian strategic options. It is not
possible to attack Israel with nuclear weapons without also subjecting large
numbers of nearby Palestinians to radioactive fallout. The lethal range of
such fallout is difficult to determine since it depends upon a variety of factors including wind direction, type of explosion (ground or air), and explosive yield. Nevertheless, high lethality rates can be expected as far away
as 20 miles under normal conditions.16 Additionally, a number of Israel’s
one million Arab citizens and resident aliens live near Jewish population
centers. There is a distinct possibility that Palestinians on the West Bank
and Gaza would also be subjected to fallout. Unfortunately for the Palestinians, Iranian targeting accuracy for its long-range missiles is highly suspect. The capabilities of these systems is quite doubtful due to ongoing
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problems associated with Iran’s missile testing program.17 If Iranian missile accuracy is off even slightly, the Palestinians, Jordanians, Lebanese,
or Syrians may pay a higher price for an Iranian nuclear strike than the
Israelis. This problem is further compounded because, unlike Israel, none
of the Arab countries has a modern civil defense system to shelter populations, and certainly no ballistic missile defense program. While it is conceivable that Iran might accept the deaths of a large number of Muslims,
such a decision would not be taken lightly by Iranian leadership and is not
consistent with their nonstop statements of concern for the Palestinians.
Additionally, some of the leadership in Tehran could be expected to
have reservations about any attack on Israel that might risk harm to Jerusalem, the third holiest city in Islam. Iranian rhetoric on restoring Jerusalem
to the Palestinians is often intense and directly relates to Tehran’s claims of
leadership of the Muslim world. In particular, the Iranian leadership treats the
Jerusalem issue as a concern that transcends Palestinian national rights and
is better understood as an Islamic issue. Iran seeks Muslim sovereignty over
Jerusalem and not its destruction. A belief that it is acceptable to destroy the
city and kill a large number of Muslims is inconsistent with Iranian rhetoric
and the teachings of Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic. Khomeini expressed public anger regarding what he called the
Israeli occupation of Jerusalem and supported spurious claims that Israel had
attempted to destroy the al Aqsa mosque in 1969 when a fire set by a deranged
person caused serious damage.18 In the headier days of the Iran-Iraq War various Iranian leaders claimed that the Islamic Republic would “liberate Jerusalem” after it finished with Iraq. Khomeini also established “Jerusalem Day,”
as a time to call for the destruction of Israel and the conquest of Jerusalem.
Supporters of Khomeini’s radicalism, such as President Ahmadinejad, continue to call for the “liberation” of Jerusalem, and there is little doubt
that the Iranian leadership embraces the rhetoric of confrontation with Israel
in an attempt to aid Palestine. There is, however, considerable uncertainty
that the leadership would be willing to attack with nuclear weapons in such
a manner as to preclude the establishment of a Palestinian state and the
ruin of Jerusalem. The Iranian fear of collateral damage and Muslim deaths
weighs more heavily on select Iranian leaders than on others, but it is clearly
a factor that Tehran needs to take into account in any strategic calculations.
Deterrence
Deterrence by Israel is the second major problem facing Iran’s strategic planners. The Israelis are believed to have significant numbers of deliv-

86

Parameters

erable nuclear weapons that they would be willing to use against Iran in any
nuclear confrontation. While the details of Israel’s strategic weapons are
carefully guarded, most Middle Easterners tend to believe that the Israeli
stockpile is large and diverse—a major factor in the matter of deterrence, as
it is based on such perceptions. These assessments of Israeli nuclear prowess are occasionally reinforced by statements in the western media or by
western leaders related to Israel’s military strength. A striking example of
such a statement was the May 2003 release by former US President Jimmy
Carter. At a news conference in London, Carter stated, “The United States
has more than 12,000 nuclear weapons, [Russia] has about the same, Great
Britain and France have several hundred, and Israel has 150 or more.”19
On a more analytical level, a November 2007 study by Anthony Cordesman from the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggests that
Israel may have the capability to destroy the Iranian nation-state without
help from any other nation, relying solely upon the accuracy and yield of its
nuclear weapons.20 Occasionally the Israelis take steps to remind Tehran of
the potential for retaliation. In June 2008, more than 100 Israeli fighter aircraft participated in a military exercise over the eastern Mediterranean Sea
and Greece; an exercise that mimicked the conditions of a strike on Iran.21
Even if Tehran were not discouraged by the apparently daunting possibility of annihilation by Israel, the Iranians are keenly aware of
the relationship between the United States and Israel. Right or wrong,
many Iranian leaders believe that an attack on Israel would lead to US retaliation against Iran.22 This conclusion is occasionally reinforced by US
political leaders. For example, in April 2008, then-Senator Hillary Clinton stated during the presidential campaign, “In the next ten years during
which they [Iran] might foolishly consider launching an attack on Israel,
we would be able to totally obliterate them.”23 While this statement was
made at the height of a political campaign, the use of the term “obliterate” is not subtle, and the Iranian leadership could hardly have welcomed
President Obama’s decision to select Senator Clinton as Secretary of State.
The idea that Iran might undertake nuclear strikes against Israel
without regard for Israeli counterstrike capabilities is sometimes explained
as “militant messianism and speculative apocalypticism,” the supposition
being that an “end of days” scenario can be facilitated by attacking Israel
(as an enemy of Islam) with nuclear weapons.24 This fear is based on the
fact that a variety of the Iranian regime members refer to Shiaism’s “Hidden
Imam” and pray for his return as the Mahdi (messiah). They also endorse
Iran’s virulent anti-Israeli rhetoric. Israeli scholar Ze’ev Maghen, a specialist on Iranian Shiaism, has disputed this interpretation of mainstream
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Iranian theology, noting that such an otherworldly view has not been incorporated into the foreign or domestic policies of the Islamic Republic.
Indeed, the victories of the Iranian revolutionaries in overthrowing the Shah
and protecting the revolution required a leadership that could think in pragmatic terms rather than religious visions. According to Maghen, “For Iran
to launch a nuclear weapon on any target would mean the end of its precious this-worldly ‘messianic’ dream of spreading Islam across the planet under the aegis of Twelver Shiaism; it would mean the end of Iran.”25
Iran, despite the zealotry and bombast of its leaders, has shown a consistent ability to conduct rational, interest-based national defense and foreign
policy that avoids deliberately provoking nuclear war. In 2003, for example,
Tehran undertook serious efforts at rapprochement with the United States due
to a fear of US attacks following Saddam’s ouster in Iraq. A number of Iranian leaders have clearly demonstrated that they are content to obtain status
using power politics and the mechanics of patronage and corruption rather
than applying the nature of otherworldly messianic thought. Former Iranian
President Hashemi Rafsanjani, a billionaire who currently heads two powerful government organizations, the Expediency Council and the Assembly
of Experts, is an example of someone who has a reputation for accumulating
personal wealth by devious means.26 Although he was a key lieutenant of
Ayatollah Khomeini in the early years of the Islamic Republic, Rafsanjani,
like other aging revolutionaries, is not above seeking rewards in this world.
Israeli Defenses
Another factor that complicates Iranian strategic planning is Israel’s expanding missile defense program, composed of the Israeli Arrow system and the US-produced Patriot PAC-2 system. The only Iranian
weapon systems that may be able to penetrate Israeli defenses are longrange ballistic missiles, currently undergoing development and testing.
Iranian aircraft and seaborne systems will almost certainly be unable to
penetrate Israeli fighter aircraft and other defenses.27 Missile defense is
one of the most important guarantees of Israel’s future security, although
it is laden with technological as well as command and control challenges.
Currently, the Israelis seek to expand their existing missile defenses
into an elaborate, layered system of protection, capable of defending against
any potential foe or array of threats. This level of protection involves a
number of different interceptor systems designed to destroy incoming
ballistic missiles at various ranges and altitudes. The idea is for the longest range, high-altitude defensive missiles (Arrow 3, as yet undeployed)
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Iranian leaders feel there is sufficient
reasons to pursue nuclear weapons based
on their need to protect the regime.

to destroy all or most of the incoming systems far from Israel. “Leakers”
from this first line of defense would then be intercepted by shorter-range
interceptors, including the Arrow 2 and the Patriot PAC-2 and PAC-3.28
The backbone of this defensive umbrella is the Arrow interceptor missile system, which has been under development since the mid-1980s. The development of this particular defensive system has received an especially high
priority as a result of the Iraqi missile strikes against Israel in 1991. Thirty-nine
Iraqi extended-range Scud (al Hussein) missiles were fired at Israel, some of
which penetrated Israel’s Patriot defenses and hit targets with their conventional warheads.29 At that time, the Arrow was not yet operational. Lessons from
that conflict served to dramatically intensify Israeli interest in missile defense.
While there is probably no such thing as leakproof missile defense,
the protection of a small nation with a limited number of targets is much
more achievable than protecting a large span of territory such as the United
States. One of the major concerns for the Israelis who are developing missile
defenses is the potential for Iran to develop more sophisticated missiles having penetration aids capable of spoofing defensive systems. Israel’s technological edge and its ongoing collaboration with the United States regarding
missile defense are major factors in the effort to defeat Iranian technology.
Although Israel’s missile defense system appears robust, even its strongest
advocates point to the fact that it has never been tested under combat conditions. This fact is responsible for an element of uncertainty about the system’s ability to protect Israel from an actual missile attack. The legacy of the
missile strikes from Operation Desert Storm remains a disturbing precedent.
As noted earlier, Israeli missile defenses are backed by a strong and
viable civil defense program. This civil defense effort consists of a network
of shelters and programs supervised and administered by the Israel Defense
Force’s Homefront Command and the National Emergency Authority.30 As
such, it serves as a final line of defense for the Israeli public and is taken quite
seriously. Many of the drills assume an importance unheard of in other societies. Israel’s largest civil defense exercise, “Turning Point,” occurred 6 to 10
April 2008 and involved simulated attacks on various cities, the emergency
impressment of private vehicles, and the movement of the Prime Minister and
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his staff to an underground shelter.31 The Prime Minster and the Cabinet were
fully involved in the exercise and in keeping with the scenario had to make a
number of decisions based on the simulated attacks and numerous casualties.
Sanctions and Preemptive Attack
The United Nations (UN) Security Council has already applied three
sets of sanctions against Iran for its failure to meet requirements of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which Iran is a party. These sanctions, along with
other more comprehensive measures by the United States and various western nations, have inflicted economic pain on Iran but have not caused Tehran
to moderate its pursuit of nuclear technology.32 While the United States has
strongly advocated additional UN sanctions against Iran, it has found little
support from such major powers as Russia and China, both also members of
the Security Council. To the dismay of many, Iran already has received significant quantities of nuclear technology from a variety of sources, to include
Pakistan’s rouge scientist A. Q. Khan.33 The reality of the situation is that
even an ironclad embargo of nuclear technology would not halt the Iranian
nuclear weapons program since the Iranians have already obtained older, but
still viable, technology capable of facilitating the enrichment of uranium.
There is also a question of motivation. The Iranian leadership feels
that it has sufficient reasons to pursue nuclear weapons based on their need
to protect the regime. Along with North Korea and Iraq, the regime in Tehran
was designated as part of the “Axis of Evil” in 2002 by President George W.
Bush. Iraq, a nonnuclear power, was invaded by the United States and its regime toppled in 2003. North Korea, which is believed to have a nuclear weapon, was not invaded or even threatened with invasion. A number of observers
have concluded that the United States was deterred by Pyongyang. Adding to
this dichotomy is the fact that the Iranian government claimed it was cooperating with the United States with regard to Afghanistan at the time, and that
Iran’s help was significant in US efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.34 The US
administration’s rhetorical emphasis on the “Bush Doctrine” and “preemptive war,” when followed by the invasion of Iraq, created great tension in
Tehran. The need to deter the United States became an urgent objective for
Iran’s leadership that was determined to safeguard the Islamic regime and
prevent the establishment of a western-style government in the Middle East.
Probably the most certain and direct strategy for halting Iran’s nuclear program would be to attack its nuclear and missile facilities. A number
of these facilities have been identified by Israeli and western intelligence
agencies, although the success of such a strategy is extremely doubtful. This
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option, however satisfying psychologically, is unlikely to serve US or Israeli
long-term interests, short of preventing a near-term missile launch by Tehran. The United States might not choose to support such a direct attack by
the Israelis, and it is doubtful that Israel would undertake an attack without
American support. The United States and the world as a whole are currently
coping with an economic recession. A new war in the Middle East would
certainly accelerate negative economic trends, possibly plunging the world
into even greater economic turmoil. An attack on Iran would undoubtedly
cause severe oil shortages and spike the price of oil to levels that would
cripple western economies, complicating the war’s economic aftermath.35
Many Iraqis and particularly the Shia Iraqis would view such an attack with unbridled hostility, with the majority of Muslim nations assuming
that Israel was operating in collusion with the United States. Under such circumstances, large-scale demonstrations against American interests would
likely occur, with radicals such as Muqtada al Sadr regaining some of their
crumbling credibility. The prospects for the survival of an Iraqi government
willing to work with the United States after any attack against Iran would be
slim, with the chances of anarchy high. The great many of the Iraqi Shias who
are willing to at least tolerate a US presence in their country would have sufficient reason to re-think that choice. Most Iraqis would be offended by any US
action, including abetting an Israeli strike on Iran, that could be viewed as a
violation of the painfully negotiated US Status of Forces Agreement with Iraq.
The United States would be viewed by most of the Muslim world and
globally as complicit in any attack on Iran regardless of whether it took part
in the actual planning or not. In order to effectively attack Iranian nuclear
facilities, large numbers of Israeli aircraft would have to repeatedly transit
the airspace of Arab nations for a period of days if not weeks. Iraq would
be one of the most useful countries in providing air routes. Arab nations
would publicly deny they had made their airspace available to the Israelis,
but Iraq would find itself, because of geographic proximity, the least credible. According to Giora Eiland, the former head of the Israeli National Security Council, “Israel cannot carry out such a strike [against Iran] without
coordination with the Americans so long as they’re in Iraq.”36 Indeed, even
a casual glance at a map of the region would suggest he is correct. As the
result of any attack, Iran would find its political standing strongly enhanced,
and efforts to isolate Tehran diplomatically or economically would collapse.
Any attack on Iran would give the current Tehran government legitimacy, especially the hard-liners, as Iranian citizens closed ranks in the
face of an external threat. The Iranians have long memories, and the political viability of extremist leaders could be extended for decades following
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such an attack.37 This perpetuation of extremist ideologies would be another
unfortunate result of the attacks. The voices of reformist leaders such as
former President Mohammad Khatami would in all likelihood be silenced.
In the past Khatami has even taken on hard-liners such as Mr. Ahmadinejad.
In response to Ahmadinejad’s statements related to the Holocaust, Khatami countered, “We should speak out if even a single Jew is killed. Don’t
forget that one of the crimes of Hitler, Nazism, and German National Socialism was the massacre of innocent people, among them many Jews.”38
Some political leaders and analysts have questioned the technical
capability of Israel to destroy the Iranian nuclear facilities. Experts suggest
that the task is beyond current Israeli capabilities.39 Israel, they maintain,
might be able to conduct a raid, but not an extended air campaign. Outgoing Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert also hinted that this might be
the case. In a far-reaching interview he addressed the question of Israeli
military action against Iran: “One senses a megalomania and a loss of proportion in the things said here about Iran. We are a country that has lost a
sense of proportion. We are a country that has lost a sense of scale.”40 If
these assessments are correct, Israel would be capable of initiating a war
with Iran but would need the United States’ help in concluding it, something the United States may choose not to do. In any event, relationships
between Israel and America would be severely tested by such events.
Conclusion
The most plausible reason for Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is not
to destroy Israel, but to deter the United States from any thoughts of regime
change directed against Tehran. Correspondingly, the most likely reason for
Iran to attack Israel would be in response to a US threat against Iran. Under
such a scenario, the Iranian leadership would judge they have nothing to lose
since their own removal was imminent. Under any other scenario, Iranian
leaders would more than likely exercise restraint, hoping to save themselves
and their country. It should never be forgotten that Israel, despite its military
advantages, is also vulnerable to attack from Iran. Likewise, it cannot be assumed that the threat of casualties to the Palestinians and Arab nations from
collateral damage will be enough to prevent an Iranian attack on Israel. The
prospect of an Iranian attack against Israel remains at some abstract level, although such a threat is exceptionally remote as previously noted in this article.
If an Iranian attack on Israel is unlikely, but still possible, the critical question then becomes what level of insecurity are the Israelis willing to
accept in exchange for avoiding the negative costs associated with a strike
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against Iran? Resorting to military force in a quest for absolute security can
often undermine the very objective one is seeking. In the case of Israel and
Iran there appear to be much better options. Israeli technology reinforced
by US assistance is far in advance of Iranian capabilities, and their investment in emerging technologies is further widening that gap. The pursuit
of this strategy means that US efforts to delay Iranian missile and nuclear
development give Israel additional time to further enhance its technological edge. Such a strategy requires more than simply exercising diplomatic
skills with Iran’s suppliers and nuclear supporters. In some cases, the United States will need to work closely with Iran’s trading partners to gain their
assistance in limiting support for Iranian nuclear and military programs.
Additionally, US-Iranian initiatives hold the potential for aiding
both the Israelis and Iranians in avoiding a cataclysmic clash. American
diplomatic engagement with Iran could help in reducing the influence of
Tehran’s hard-liners, who successfully were able to portray the Bush Administration and its allies as inherently threatening to Iran. This portrayal
contrasts sharply with the Obama Administration’s more benign reputation
for seeking diplomatic solutions to strategic challenges. President Obama’s
reputation and a new administration can be useful as an additional source of
diplomatic leverage. Should the United States fail in efforts at diplomatic
progress with Iran, it would be in a much stronger position to seek additional
UN economic sanctions against Tehran. President Obama could then easily
claim that his Administration honestly sought to improve relations with Tehran but was thwarted by Iran’s unreasonable behavior related to the nuclear
issue. A US call for increased sanctions would then have greater credibility
with the American public and the global community, even hurting the legitimacy of the Iranian regime’s position with its citizens and supporters.
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